

25X1

[Redacted Box]

Certificate of Distinction
20 February 1980

- FBI since 1951
- Close association w/CIA since 1960
- Intell resp. culminate w/appointment as
Asst. Dir., Intel Div., April 1978
- This award really only tells half the story
- Bill is the kind of individual who makes this
govt work
 - * First rate knowledge of job -
US's leading expert in CI
 - * Keep eye on what's important for the U.S.
 - Even in darkest days of CIA-FBI
relationship, Bill realized that
CI only works if CIA & FBI work
together
 - * Contribution uniquely important
 - In last few years he has been
instrumental in developing strong
CIA-FBI team CI capability
- Bill - you will be missed - you can take great
pride in the work you have done and its importance
to this nation.

Congress - 3 roles

Consumer, Overseer, Protector/Provider

1 Consumer

Look on Congress as one of our important consumers

Historically, IC has supported Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. But, with expansion of IC collection/analysis into economics as well as terrorism narcotics, grain production, etc., the potential exists to support almost all the Congressional committees.

In turn, subject matter of almost every Congressional committee has implications for international relations and can make use of IC data

More committees receiving support

- Senate Budget - WW roundup
- Senate Energy - series of 8 hearings in which Agency specialists will testify on geo-politics
- House Agriculture - Sov grain prospects

All part of determined effort made to provide more support to Congressional consumers.

- a. Number briefings annually doubled since 1976
e.g., 56 briefings to HFAC in 1979
- b. Requests for written documents quadrupled
- c. Principal current intell. publication goes to 8 comm. each day.
- d. All unclassified publications go to 105 members of both House

Still, we need to do better --

Worldwide briefings - some committees - some not need more than once a year

Would like more effective mechanism for identifying Congress' needs

Not clear just how - can do better

Several limits must be acknowledged:

1. Congress must keep in that the IC functions
as the confidential advisor to the President.
Advice is non-pol - but are political sensitivities
as to how, when, what form intell provided.
Privilege of exec to protect details of the
decision process need not in any way reduce the
level or quality of support the IC can provide
the Congress. If undercut - hurt quality of
decision process -
2. We are an element of Executive; Resources structured
for Exec Branch -
If 535 Congressmen; 48 committees become too active -
infinite additional workload
Short limits special projects, studies
3. The IC must consciously remain apart from policy-
formulation if it is to be a credible source.
Often must dodge answers to questions on what course
of action we would recommend. Nevertheless, with
exercise of good judgment, the IC can come very
close to the boundary of policymaking to enhance
its service to policymakers. For example:
e.g., Can not only comment on foreign reactions
proposed policies but could also hypothetical policies

II Oversight and foreign policy

1. Adequacy of intell support to policymakers

Review of collection/analysis -

Was adequate to Pres/Cong needs?

Will IC have ability to support policies moving toward, e.g.,

SALT verification?

2. Surrogates for public in reassuring against abuses -

Important to retaining public confidence that both Exec & Legis

branches of gov't play role here.

Potential negative effects

1. Leaks

Hughes-Ryan

2. Micro - management -

Impede intell/C.A.

3. Consistency of C.A. & policy

Are we at cross purposes?

Double check

III Provider/Supporter

1. Provides in budget process

In course - exercises strong control

Particular responsibility to shape future capabilities -

1. Good - detached

2. Bad - tech decisions by series committees

2. Support in terms of providing verification to public on accusations

that cannot be refuted in unclassified forum.

IV Overall

Believe in midst important evolution or experiment -

Integration of legis intimately into intell process our country

Not approached anywhere else world -

Some movement

Overall relationship is still evolving

Several years to go

Pleased direction

Pleased way oversight and support working out

Pleased increasing interest of Congress in
our product.

Risks

Too much exposure

Intell secret business

Congress no more leaky than anyone

But numbers increase

Too fine a management

Can't have two masters

Beleive moving to right balance in both areas

Charter legislation should help define.

DCI
20 Feb 80

1. Major challenges

a. Anticipate areas of concern

30 yrs ago - Sov mil

Today in econ warfare, terrorism,
grain forecasting -

Nuc prolif; pop; food; terrorism ?

b. Provide in-depth analytic support

Languages; specialty skills; area knowledge

On tap - never used ?

c. Select and utilize burgeoning tech systems

\$ - better vs. need

Absorb quantity

d. Make HUMINT worth risks

Tasking

Tradecraft, cover

Risks in friendly nations

e. Integrate all sources -

Societal change

Two hats -

Advantages of splitting

Avoid conflict of interests

Disadvantages

No horses

DCI

20 Feb 1980

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to lead off the Administration's testimony with respect to the proposed Congressional charters for the Intelligence Community. For the entire three years that I have been the Director of Central Intelligence, I have been a strong supporter of these charters.

The first reason for this is the fact that the guiding legislation today is out of date. It is the National Security Act of 1947 as amended. The evolution of the United States Intelligence Community in the intervening years has not conformed with the image which the constructors of that legislation had in mind; clearly, we are not doing anything illegal or in contradiction to those laws, but the picture they portray of what the Intelligence Community is and how it functions simply has not worked out in practice. I believe it is important that the Congress enunciate to us and to the American people what kind of an Intelligence Community it expects and wants.

Secondly, intelligence is by its very nature a risk-taking business. The intelligence professionals of our country are trained to take those risks on behalf of the country. They deserve, I believe, as express a description of what they are expected to do and not to do as it is humanly possible to create. There are definite limitations as to how such authorities and restrictions can be expressed, but we owe it to our intelligence officers to give them the best guidance we can.

They will still necessarily have to assume considerable initiative and risk on their own, but we should provide them all the support that is possible.

Thirdly, in the last five or six years we have been moving to an exciting and important new concept in the world of intelligence. This is the concept of close Congressional oversight of the intelligence process. It is the complement to the authorizations and the restrictions which should be enunciated in a charter. In short, through oversight the Congress can and should check on whether the authorizations are being used to good advantage and whether the restrictions are, in fact, being followed in their spirit and their letter. It is, under this present concept of intelligence, impossible to have the authorizations and the restrictions without the oversight, for if one legislates such precise authorizations or restrictions as would be necessary without oversight one is almost certain to hobble the intelligence operations beyond usefulness. This new and important concept of the complementariness of authorizations and controls on the one hand, and oversight on the other, needs to be clearly enunciated by the Congress so that the citizens of this country can readily understand how the Congress is exercising its responsibilities in an area where the public cannot be adequately informed to make its own judgment.